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Highlights 
 The paper is comparing the effect of currency board arrangements with other 
monetary/exchange rate regimes on the credibility of the monetary authority 
 Answers to survey question about the expectations about the local currency stability 
are used as an indicator of the credibility of monetary authority 
 The results suggest a positive effect of CBA on monetary author’s credibility  
 Additionally, the results imply that the positive effect of currency boards is greater the 
worse the expectations about economic prospects and the lower the trust in government 
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Abstract 
 
Currency Boards are usually argued to increase the credibility of the monetary authority, 
although this effect ultimately depends on the economic, political and institutional 
circumstances in the specific country. Few studies have previously been able to address this 
issue empirically. Using a novel database, the analysis conducted in this paper finds that, 
other things being equal, the credibility of the monetary authority is likely to be higher in 
those European transition countries with currency board arrangements, namely Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The results also suggest that currency board arrangements are 
more likely to increase the credibility of the monetary authority in countries with a low level 
of trust in government and a weak economy. These findings imply that the maintenance of 
currency board arrangements in recent years in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria may 
have been advantageous.  
 
Keywords: currency board arrangement; credibility; trust in currency; trust in government  
 
                                                          
1
 The survey data used in this analysis are derived from the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) Euro Surveys which 
were provided by the OeNB solely for research purposes. These data were obtained under special contractual 
arrangements from the OeNB and are not available from the authors. The OeNB has no responsibility for the 
analysis and views expressed in this paper. We are grateful to the Austrian National Bank for making the survey 
data available for this research. 
2
 Coresponding author; contacts: +447462174875; +441782 294340 (fax); +38762762471; postal address: Trg 
oslobođenja 1, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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JEL classification codes: E52, E58, E42 
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1. Introduction  
 
A currency board is an arrangement under which a country fixes its nominal exchange rate to 
some foreign currency and maintains 100 percent backing of its monetary base with foreign 
exchange. Under an orthodox currency board arrangement a central bank cannot implement 
monetary policy using traditional monetary policy instruments. These rules are typically 
embedded in law and therefore can be changed only if the law is altered, which makes the 
currency board a “tougher” regime than other monetary regimes with a fixed exchange rate. 
Currency board arrangements (CBA hereafter) were introduced in some countries in the 
process of transition to a market economy which needed to achieve and maintain monetary 
stability. Implementation of a currency board means that a country has no discretion in 
monetary policy, which is likely to result in an increase in the credibility of policy and greater 
confidence that the target(s) of the monetary authority will be achieved.
3
 Hence, it is expected 
to impose strict discipline on the monetary authorities regarding their management of 
domestic money. However, an increased level of credibility of the monetary authority under a 
CBA is not inevitable, since sustaining credibility depends on the state of the economy and 
the specific (political/institutional) circumstances in the country. The question as to whether 
“tougher” regimes result in a higher credibility of the monetary authority and, if so, under 
what circumstances, therefore needs to be answered by empirical analysis.  
 
Credibility of a CBA has previously been investigated by estimating switches in the interest 
rate differentials between a CBA and its anchor currency country. In contrast, in this paper the 
hypothesised increased credibility of announced policy under a CBA is investigated by 
comparing the effect of different monetary/exchange rate regimes on citizens’ expectations 
regarding the future stability of their local currency. The effect of CBA is also estimated 
conditional on the economic situation and level of trust in the government in a country. The 
estimations are conducted using survey data from ten European transition countries, two of 
which, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH hereafter) and Bulgaria, operate a CBA. Due to 
restrictions imposed by CBA both BH’s and the Bulgarian central bank have to hold at least 
100% coverage of their monetary base in foreign assets and cannot finance their government 
or banks. Both banks deviate from the orthodox CBA by setting the reserve requirement rate 
for banks. However, the Bulgarian currency board deviates more from orthodox CBA. 
Namely, according to the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (Article 33, Paragraphs 2 and 
3), ‘upon emergence of a liquidity risk that may affect the stability of the banking system, the 
Bulgarian National Bank may extend to a solvent bank lev-denominated (i.e. in the domestic 
currency) credits with maturity no longer than three months, provided they are fully 
collateralized by gold, foreign currency or other such high-liquid assets. These credits may be 
extended solely up to the amount of the excess of the lev equivalent of the gross international 
reserves over the total amount of monetary liabilities of the Bulgarian National Bank’. The 
Central Bank of BH cannot act as a lender of last resort under any circumstances. 
 
The degree of credibility has been argued to affect the stability and sustainability of a CBA 
                                                          
3
 Bordo and Siklos (2015) do not address CBA but do maintain that the Gold Standard, also at the “tough” end of 
the spectrum of monetary arrangements, ‘improves central bank credibility’ (p.6).    
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regime, since the absence of credibility is likely to lead to a large-scale conversion of 
domestic currency into other currencies, which is likely to result in a currency crisis. The 
importance of credibility under a CBA and the rationale for using respondents’ 
trust/confidence in the future stability of local currency as an indicator of the monetary 
policy’s credibility is examined in the following section. The determinants of the credibility 
of the monetary authority/regime are appraised in Section 3. After presenting the survey data 
and its descriptive statistics in Section 4, estimation results are presented in Section 5. Finally, 
the main conclusions arising from the empirical analysis are discussed. 
 
2. Credibility of a CBA 
 
The credibility of the monetary regime is usually identified as its important feature, since 
economic policies are believed to be more effective if they are credible to private economic 
agents (Blackburn and Christensen, 1989). A high level of credibility of a monetary regime is 
expected not only to reduce the time-inconsistency problem and therefore to provide lower 
inflation expectations and consequently a lower inflation rate, but also to lessen speculative 
attacks, contribute to macroeconomic stability and attract foreign investments (although 
achieving these latter goals are likely to require a combination of additional policies as well). 
Mulino (2002) and Ledesma-Rodriguez et al. (2004) argued that low credibility might be a 
destabilising element and a source of future currency crises, especially in an economy with a 
CBA or fixed exchange rate.  
 
Blackburn and Christensen (1989, p.2) provided the most general interpretation of credibility: 
‘the extent to which beliefs about the current and future course of economic policy are 
consistent with the program originally announced by policy makers’ (emphasis added). In the 
context of a CBA we may argue that credibility refers to the public’s expectations with 
respect to the commitment to maintain a fixed exchange rate (stable national currency against 
the anchor currency), since that is the announced policy.
4
 This proposition can be argued to 
apply to all the countries in this sample, given that all of them effectively peg against the euro. 
However, other things being equal, these expectations are likely to be firmer in countries with 
a CBA since it is harder to deviate from a fixed rate as the (fixed exchange rate) rule is 
embedded in law and the costs of changing legislation are argued to be high. However, 
achievement of a high level of credibility of the monetary authority under a CBA is not 
automatic, since sustaining credibility depends on the state of the economy (Drazen and 
Masson, 1994) and the specific (political/institutional) circumstances in the country 
(Blackburn and Christensen, 1989; Desquilbet and Nenovsky, 2007).  
  
Studies which investigated the credibility of monetary/exchange rate regimes usually used the 
interest rate differential relative to the anchor-currency (Arestis and Mouratidis, 2005; Ho and 
                                                          
4
 In CBA countries confidence in the local currency’s future stability can be argued to be the main determinant 
of the credibility of the monetary authority, since the currency’s stability is its primary target and this is specified 
in the central bank laws in all European transition countries that implement a CBA. This primarily refers to 
stability against the anchor currency, but since one of the criteria when choosing the anchor currency is its 
stability against other major world’s currencies, it can be argued to refer to overall currency stability. 
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Ho, 2009), which is argued to be a good proxy for expected devaluation and credibility of 
fixed exchange rates. Interest rate differentials have also been used for estimating the 
credibility of the European Monetary System or comparable exchange rate regimes (Weber et 
al., 1991; Drazen and Masson, 1994; Ledesma-Rodriguez et al., 2005). In these studies a 
Markov-switching model is commonly used in determining switches in the money market 
interest rate differentials. However, Mulino (2002) and Feuerstein and Grimm (2006) 
emphasised that the gain in credibility should be represented/measured by the extent to which 
the targets/announced policies influence expectations about future policy. However, in the 
latter studies no empirical investigation, based on actual expectations, was conducted.  
 
Since the beginning of the recent global crisis another group of studies have analysed levels of 
trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) (Fischer and Hahn, 2008; Gros and Roth, 2010; 
Bursian and Furth, 2012; Walti, 2012). In these studies trust in the ECB is used as an indicator 
of its credibility. Fischer and Hahn (2008) argued that the evidence suggested this trust was 
based on the achievement of the ECB’s primary goal. In our analysis, responses to a survey 
question related to trust/confidence in a national currency are taken to reflect trust in the 
respective central bank. The question about trust in their currency can be considered “closer” 
to respondents than a question about the monetary authority, whose actions and policies they 
may or may not be familiar with. As argued by Bursian and Furth (2012), agents are bounded 
rationally and are unlikely to fully understand the mandate of the central bank. Trust in a 
currency can be argued to be more relevant since, based on this trust, residents make their 
decisions about using the national currency as a medium of exchange and store of value, 
which then affects the stability and sustainability of their national monetary and financial 
system as a whole. This approach directly utilises expectations without the need to use any 
proxies for expected (in)stability of the local currency. Bursian and Furth (2012) also 
emphasise the importance of the subjective component when estimating citizens’ 
perceptions/expectations. Moreover, they emphasise that having a “tough” policy is not 
enough, but that people have to trust that the policy really is and will remain “tough” in order 
for the policy to have the expected effect. Therefore, when estimating the credibility of a 
monetary regime one should prefer subjective attitudes to observing changes in variables that 
are considered to be “good proxies”. Finally, the analysis of subjective attitudes captured in 
survey responses draws support from Roth et al. (2012, p.14) who cite Banducci et al. (2009) 
to the effect that ‘actual economic reality – as summarised in official economic statistics – 
does not necessarily agree with the perceived economic situation’.   
 
In order to capture these subjective attitudes (answers to) questions from surveys conducted 
by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB) are used.
 
 Surveys were conducted in ten European 
transition countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, and Serbia), two of which, namely Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria, operate under a CBA. This paper draws upon eight survey waves 
conducted from 2007 fall until 2011 spring (2 surveys per year) and the question related to the 
expectations about a currency’s stability was included in all eight surveys. The precise 
question from the Austrian National Bank dataset used as an indicator of credibility is: ‘Over 
the next five years, the [local currency] will be very stable and trustworthy’. Bursian and 
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Furth (2012) emphasise that credibility and trust are closely related and in the following 
discussion these terms are used interchangeably. 
 
Previously, Valev and Carlson (2007) have used public expectations regarding a currency’s 
stability to assess the credibility of a CBA. However, this study focused on Bulgaria and 
sought to assess the possibility of a collapse of its CBA, with a sharp devaluation of the 
national currency, utilising only descriptive statistics. In our paper the expectations about the 
local currency’s stability are the chosen indicator of a CBA’s credibility and this can be 
assumed to be “closer” to respondents than a question about the probability of devaluation. In 
addition, the effect of CBA on credibility is compared with other regimes and investigated 
conditional on economic and political/institutional circumstances.  
 
3. Determinants of the credibility of a monetary regime 
 
In order to estimate the effect of a CBA on the credibility of the monetary authority a dummy 
variable is included and captures the difference between the effect of CBA and other 
monetary arrangements on credibility. Endogeneity, caused by simultaneity, is not likely to be 
an issue between the expectations of currency stability and the CBA, since there is no 
rationale for assuming that current expectations about currency stability affect the likelihood 
of a CBA being in operation/having a CBA (in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria the 
decision concerning the introduction of a CBA was taken and implemented long before our 
sample period). Beside the CBA dummy variable, it is necessary to control for other 
potentially relevant variables. However, there is no substantive theoretical or empirical 
research on the choice of determinants of trust/credibility. In order to assess what additional 
controls should be included in the model, in this section previous studies of a monetary 
regime’s credibility are appraised.  
 
The degree of credibility of the monetary authority/policy has been addressed in many studies 
starting with Barro and Gordon’s paper from 1983 in which they developed a model of the 
incentives for a monetary authority to deceive. This model was subsequently developed to 
include other determinants of the monetary authority’s credibility apart from time-
(in)consistency considerations. Drazen and Masson (1994), Mulino (2002), and Castren et al. 
(2010) emphasised that a high unemployment rate may undermine the credibility of monetary 
policy under a fixed exchange rate (and CBA). Mulino (2002) argued that external shocks 
and/or speculative attacks might also reduce the CBA’s credibility and result in recession. 
Feuerstein and Grimm (2006) noted that the credibility of the CBA itself is transient since its 
maintenance depends on the economic situation in a country. Bursian and Furth (2012) 
emphasise the importance of macroeconomic conditions, country specifics, as well as the 
political views of respondents, in the trust-building process. Ehrmann et al. (2010) argue that 
public trust in the ECB during the crisis can be explained by the economic situation, trust in 
the overall European project and financial and banking sector (in)stability. In their empirical 
analysis they also control for respondents’ political orientation and trust in the European 
Commission, implying the importance of controlling for political circumstances. Valev and 
Carlson (2007) also argued that the political affiliation of respondents should be taken into 
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account. Walti (2012) emphasise the importance of controlling for trust in economic 
institutions, especially in a period of crisis when uncertainty is increased. Walti also 
underlines the importance of controlling for social loss functions (proxied by movements in 
inflation and unemployment), as well as other country-specific developments and time 
specifics. Beside ‘picking up’ unobservable time-invariant country heterogeneity, Walti 
(2012) notes that inclusion of country fixed effects also controls for a possible time-invariant 
framing effect characteristic of surveys. Country and time fixed effects are also included in 
the empirical analysis conducted by Gros and Roth (2010) and Bursian and Furth (2012), 
although the latter include time dummies only for the years of crisis. Based on suggestions 
from these studies, the characteristics of the countries in our sample and the specific question 
used as an indicator of credibility of CBA, the preferred specification of the model is now 
addressed. 
 
Since subjective attitudes are used as the dependent variable, it is important to control for 
respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics. In this analysis age, gender, level of 
education completed and employment status are used as controls.
 
We also control for the 
economic situation and political circumstances in each country, as well as membership of a 
country-group and time specifics (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
 
The economic situation in a country can be captured by either using the actual 
macroeconomic variables or respondents’ perceived values. Since economic theory is based 
on the proposition that economic agents respond to reality as they experience and perceive it, 
we prefer a model utilising the expectations (perceptions about the future) of the economic 
situation in a country as a control variable to a model with the actual (official) 
macroeconomic variables. Moreover, since we use respondents’ expectations about their 
currency as the dependent variable it is more appropriate to use their expectations about their 
country’s macroeconomic performance as a control, since it is more likely that people base 
their expectations about a currency on their own expectations about the economic situation. 
As emphasised by Uslaner (2010, p.112) ‘trust depends on information and experience’. 
Moreover, using one variable for the economic situation enables us to estimate the effect of 
CBA on credibility conditional on the economic situation (by using interaction terms; this is 
explained below in more detail). Using a set of macroeconomic variables would be more 
complex, for both estimation and interpretation. Moreover, collinearity is likely to be more 
pronounced in a model with actual macroeconomic variables, since the same value for the 
same macroeconomic variable would have to be attached to all respondents that come from 
the same country and are interviewed in the same year. Accordingly, using the actual 
macroeconomic variables would dictate a small sample (10 countries, 3 years), while the 
number of observations from the survey is much larger (10 countries, approximately 1,000 
respondents per country per survey, 6 survey waves). This means a difference in potential 
sample sizes of three orders of magnitude. Therefore, even where underlying relationships are 
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present in the data, a model using official macroeconomic variables is not likely to yield 
precise estimates, whereas the preferred model where all the variables used are derived from 
survey data can give more precise estimates. Another reason for preferring subjective 
measures of the economic performance over the official macroeconomic data is that the 
official statistics, especially in the less developed countries, are usually argued to be limited 
and unreliable (Sanfey and Teksoz, 2005). Finally, as argued by Ho (2001) (as cited in 
Desquilbet and Nenovsky, 2007, p.9) ‘human behaviour is an immediate source of a possible 
crisis’ and we may assume that any such behaviour is reflected in residents’ expectations. 
Therefore, our preferred model is one in which subjective attitudes are used.  
 
The precise question from the surveys used as an indicator of the economic situation in the 
preferred model specification is: ‘Over the next five years, the economic situation of [my 
country] will improve’. As noted above, it is important to control for the political 
circumstances as well. This is especially relevant for the countries in our sample, since Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Bulgaria have had a relatively high degree of political uncertainty. The 
survey question regarding the political circumstances in a country from the surveys is: 'I 
would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For 
each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: 1. 
Government/cabinet of ministers.’ It might be expected that the better the expectations about 
the economic situation and the higher the level of trust in government then the more stable 
and trustworthy the local currency is expected to be. From the review of previous studies, we 
may conclude that, even after controlling for the economic situation and the level of trust in 
government, the ultimate effect of CBA on the credibility of monetary policy depends on the 
state of the economy and the level of trust in government. Besides including the economic 
situation and level of trust as independent variables, it follows that these should also be 
interacted with the CBA variable in order to estimate/observe the effect of CBA conditional 
on different economic situations and different levels of trust in government. Indeed, 
Blackburn and Christensen (1989, p.4) argued that: ‘In general, credibility of monetary policy 
will depend not just upon monetary policy alone but rather upon the perceived coherence of 
the overall macroeconomic program, together with the intellectual and political consensus on 
the economic theory being used and the objectives and conduct of economic policy.’  
 
Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2007) argued that in CBA countries a source of trust in the local 
currency is trust in the anchor currency (in our case the euro). Therefore, we control for the 
effect of trust in the anchor currency, by using answers to another question from the survey: 
‘Over the next five years, the euro will be a very stable and trustworthy currency’. Since the 
local currencies in both CBA countries were pegged to the euro in the observed period it 
might be expected that confidence in the local currency is highly determined by the degree of 
trust in the euro.
5
 To control for any shocks that are common for all countries we include time 
                                                          
5
 Although closely related, confidence in the stability of the local currency and the euro are not likely to be 
jointly determined since the stability of the euro depends on its exchange rate with other currencies such as the 
dollar, but not significantly on the national currencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria. In contrast trust 
in their local currency is likely to depend on factors such as the economic situation and political circumstances in 
the CBA country which have no effect on the level of confidence in the euro. 
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(wave) fixed effects. This is especially important given that the period observed was a period 
of global financial crisis. However, given the interest in the effect of CBA, due to perfect 
collinearity we include country-group dummies instead of country dummies. Namely, BH’s 
and a Bulgarian country dummies and a CBA dummy cannot be included in the same 
regressions, since the first two sum to the second.  
 
In order to observe the effect of a CBA we need a CBA dummy, without country dummies, 
that will compare the joint effect of Bulgaria and BH to all other countries. The CBA variable 
captures what is unique to BH and Bulgaria compared to all the other countries (i.e. what 
distinguishes them from the other countries). Based on the comparison of macroeconomic 
variables and world development indicators
6
 we can conclude that the only outstanding 
similarity between BH and Bulgaria is a CBA and that there are no other characteristics 
common to those two but different from those of the other countries in our sample. For 
example, the aggregate EBRD index on progress in transition averaged for 1998-2012 for BH 
was 2.72; for Bulgaria 3.55. Finally, with respect to recent history, ethnic composition and 
relationship with the European Union there are substantial differences between BH and 
Bulgaria: BH recently experienced war, while Bulgaria had not in the recent past; BH is a 
multinational country, while this ethnic diversity is not so pronounced in Bulgaria; BH is not 
an EU member, Bulgaria is. To our knowledge, there is no set of economic, political or 
historical characteristics that define these countries as a distinct group. Therefore, it is a 
reasonable presumption to believe that the CBA dummy variable is capturing the effect of 
CBA rather than some other set of common characteristic(s) of these countries.  
 
However, by not including country dummies we are neglecting time-invariant country 
specifics and so run the risk that their influence may be picked up by other variables in the 
model, including the CBA dummy. In order to partially control for country specifics we 
include the expectations about the economic situation in a country and trust in government. 
Moreover, although we cannot include individual county dummies, three country-group 
dummies are included. Fisher (2010) argued for the inclusion of geographic region dummies 
for groups of countries ‘sufficiently similar to share common socio-economic traits, possibly  
caused by imitation effects, exchange of population and other types of spill-over across 
neighbouring countries’ (p.16,17) and that estimates will not be biased by the omission of 
country fixed effects if regional/country-group effects are controlled for. Therefore, we 
control for EU membership; for Ex-Yugoslav member countries; and for the level of 
development. Inclusion of the EU dummy variable (which is 1 for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania for the whole sample period) is based on the assumption that 
those who entered the EU have more rigid rules regarding their inflation rate, exchange rate 
etc., which may (positively) affect expectations about both the local currency and the 
economic situation in a country. The inclusion of the Ex-Yugoslav dummy (which is set to 1 
for BH, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia) is based on a geographical and historical rationale. 
Namely, these countries have different experiences from other countries in the sample. These 
ex-Yugoslav countries share the same experience of loss of monetary unity and specific 
                                                          
6
 A detailed comparison of trends in macroeconomic variables and government indicators between transition 
countries is available from the authors upon request.  
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political disturbances after the break-up of Yugoslavia (in the early 1990s), which can still 
affect the credibility of their individual/national monetary authorities (formed after the break-
up). Finally, the level of development is controlled for by identifying the group of countries 
with a GDP per capita higher than $10,000 (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). 
This group of countries also has the highest scores for the world development indicators (rule 
of law, control of corruption, regulatory quality, political stability, voice and accountability). 
People in countries with a higher level of development might expect the situation in their 
countries, and therefore their local currencies, to be more stable than those in less developed 
countries.  
 
4. Descriptive analysis of the survey data  
 
As noted in the previous sections, answers to questions from the Austrian National Bank 
surveys are used in the analysis. These surveys were exclusively made available for this 
research by the Austrian National Bank and have not previously been used outside the Bank 
or for this kind of research. For each survey, face-to-face interviews were conducted in ten 
countries from 2007 to 2011 (two survey waves per year), with approximately 1,000 
respondents (which are different in each survey wave) per country and wave. The question 
about trust in government was not included in the first three survey waves so the preferred 
specification is estimated on a dataset with approximately 40,000 observations. Additionally, 
as a robustness check, estimations are conducted on a larger dataset, where all available data 
is used, but the trust in government variable is excluded. The sample was selected via a multi-
stage stratified random sample procedure, with the exception of Bulgaria, where quota 
sampling was applied. Respondents can be considered to be representative of their respective 
population structure, since all countries’ regions are represented, except in Poland where the 
population of only the ten largest cities was sampled.
7
 Therefore, respondents are broadly 
representative of different countries’ regions, genders, ages, level of education and 
employment status.  
 
In several recent studies the importance of controlling for survey design characteristics when 
using survey data in estimations has been emphasised (Chromy and Abeyasekera, 2005; 
Kreuter and Valliant, 2007; Pitblado, 2009). These studies argue the need to control for four 
features usually involved in sample surveys, which may have ‘potentially significant 
consequences for estimations’ (Kreuter and Valliant, 2007, p.2). These features are: weights; 
stratification (stratum/strata); clustering (primary sampling units (PSUs)); and finite sample 
population (FSP). These can be controlled for by defining these features in the “svyset” 
(available in Stata12) and specifying a “svy” option before the estimation command. In the 
case of our survey data there are differences in the sampling frames and approaches to 
sampling between the countries and it is more complicated to control for survey design in 
cross-section analysis. Moreover, the survey database only contains full data on weights. It 
                                                          
7
 Further details can be found on the Austrian National Bank website: 
http://www.oenb.at/en/geldp_volksw/zentral_osteuropa/Eurosurvey/Survey/survey.jsp .  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
12 
 
does not contain data for the “strata” variable and contains a primary sampling unit (PSU) 
variable that is incomplete and therefore cannot be used to control for the clustering effect, i.e. 
common unobservable features between individuals in the same PSU, which are not shared (at 
least, not to the same extent) with individuals in other PSUs – which correspondingly adjusts 
standard errors. However, standard errors that control for clustering should be obtained, if 
clustering is present (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  
 
Alternatively, as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2010, p.175), ‘a conservative approach 
is to use non-survey methods and obtain standard errors that cluster on a variable that 
subsumes the PSUs, for example, a geographic region such as a state’. Therefore, we conduct 
inference using robust standard errors (SEs) clustered on region, as a locational variable, since 
the question about the expectations concerning the economic situation (which is used as the 
independent variable) might depend on the region of the respondent. Namely, those coming 
from less developed regions of the country may be more likely to expect the economic 
situation to be worse than those who live in the capital city region where production and 
industry are more developed and the level of employment is usually higher. Therefore, we 
estimated the specifications using robust SEs clustered on region. Nicholas and Schaffer 
(2007) argued that the cluster-robust standard error estimator converges to the true standard 
error as the number of clusters, not the number of observations, approaches infinity and that 
‘at higher levels the number of clusters will be smaller, so the asymptotic results for the 
estimator are less likely to hold’. Since quota sampling8, in which the sample is chosen to be 
representative of the population, is applied only in Bulgaria, the weights are taken into 
account, since it enables us to apply estimates not only to the sample but also to the full 
population (Kreuter and Valliant, 2007, p.2). However, since there is a debate in the literature 
on how and whether to use weights in econometric analysis, both weighted and unweighted 
results are reported. However, estimation with the available survey design controls does not 
suggest any big difference in the results, which is an indicator of the stability of the model.  
 
Two countries from the sample, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria, have a CBA. 
Therefore, one fifth of respondents are from the countries with a CBA. In order to generate 
initial insights about any differences, the responses related to the credibility of the monetary 
policy between respondents in the CBA and those in non-CBA countries are compared. 
According to the descriptive statistics presented in Figure 2, answers to questions related to 
the assessment of the future stability of (and trust in) the local currency indicate higher 
currency trustworthiness in CBA compared to non-CBA countries. According to the chi2 test, 
these differences are statistically significant at all conventional levels of significance, which 
                                                          
8
 As noted in Saunders et al. (2009, p.235): ‘Quota sampling is entirely non-random and is normally used for 
interview surveys. It is based on the idea that your sample will represent the population, as the variability in your 
sample for various quota variables is the same as that in the population’.  
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suggest that it is likely that there is some relationship between these expectations and the 
presence of a CBA.
9
 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
 
 
Regarding economic sentiments, approximately 50 percent in non-CBA and 60 percent in 
CBA countries did not expect that the economic situation in their country would improve over 
the next five years (Figure 3). According to the statistical tests, these differences are 
statistically significant at all conventional levels of significance. Approximately 25 percent of 
respondents answered that they trust the government and the answers are quite similar 
between CBA and non-CBA countries (Figure 4). For this question, beside “do not know” 
answers there are also “neither trust nor distrust” answers with a high percentage of 
respondents (approximately 20 percent for the “trust in government” question) answering this 
in both groups of countries. 
 
 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
 
 
There are a number of “do not know” answers to all questions in the surveys. Since these 
answers cannot be rated/ordered in the main estimations these answers are excluded. It might 
be argued that by excluding these answers additional information is lost, though there are 
never more than 14 percent of these answers and the number of remaining observations is 
high. However, in the sensitivity analysis these answers are included as a control, by creating 
a dummy variable for them and including this as an independent variable. These answers for 
the dependent variable may also be included by creating a separate category of the dependent 
variable and estimating the model with multinomial probit, since this estimator allows more 
than two non-ordinal categories of the dependent variable. However, since we have 
interaction terms in our preferred model, the interpretation of the results from this estimator is 
very complicated (Williams, 2012) and therefore we prefer the probit estimator. However, in 
the robustness check multinomial probit, with “do not know” answers included, is estimated. 
The effect of CBA on credibility is now explored using the model specified in Section 3. 
 
5. Empirical analysis   
 
                                                          
9
 Beside the ‘chi2’ test, ‘gamma’ and ‘taub’ tests are also performed, since these have been suggested or testing 
association between ordinal variables (Torres, 2007). These tests generated the same results as the ‘chi2’ test. 
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Since the respondents are different in different waves, we cannot use panel estimation. 
Therefore, in order to get as many observations as possible, we utilise a pooled cross-section. 
This strategy is preferred over cross-section analysis as it produces higher variability in the 
data given the ability to capture variation in both (time and space) dimensions simultaneously 
(Podesta, 2002). On the other hand, in pooled cross-sections there is a potential problem of 
errors being correlated across time (serial correlation) and countries (for additional advantages 
and disadvantages of using a pooled cross-section see Podesta, 2002). In our analysis, we 
address these issues by the inclusion of time and country-group dummy variables, these 
dummies should remove any country-group time invariant characteristics from the error term, 
while wave dummies should remove all time-specific country-group invariant characteristics. 
Additionally, we report cluster-robust standard errors, which are inflated to take account of 
the loss of information associated with error correlation.  
 
As explained in Section 3, the question: ‘Over the next five years, the [local currency] will be 
very stable and trustworthy’ is used as the dependent variable. There are seven categories 
offered, as noted in Figure 2. Since it is argued that interpretation of the results when the 
dependent variable includes many scales is complicated (see Long and Freese, 2001; 
Wooldridge, 2002), especially when interaction terms are included in the regression 
(Williams, 2012), the answers are aggregated into two categories: “agree” (which combines 
the answers “strongly agree”, “agree”, “somewhat agree”); and “disagree” (which combines 
the answers “somewhat disagree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”). The latter is used as the 
base (omitted) category. Do not know answers are excluded. In all specifications the dummy 
variable for CBA is included, which is 1 for countries with a CBA and 0 otherwise. The 
variable for the expectations about the future euro stability (ExpECSagreei), for which the 
answers are aggregated in “agree” and “disagree” categories (the same way as for the 
dependent variable, with the “disagree” category used as a base), is included. The trust in 
government variable (Gtrusti) has five categories of answers (from 1 to 5, respectively: “I 
trust completely”, “I somewhat trust”, “I neither trust nor distrust”, “I somewhat distrust” and 
“I do not trust at all” (the first category is used as a base). The variable for the economic 
situation expectations (ExpESi) has the same categories as the dependent variable (“strongly 
agree” is used as a base and, in the first analysis, we exclude “do not know” answers). 
Moreover, we assume that the effect of CBA is also conditional on the level of trust in 
government and expectations about the economic situation. It has been argued that any 
finding of interaction in a model without a product term is unreliable (Nagler, 1991, Brambor 
et al., 2006) and, accordingly, the interaction term between CBA and trust in government 
(CBA*Gtrusti), on the one hand, and CBA and the economic situation (CBA*ExpESi), on the 
other, are included in the preferred specification. As noted in Section 3 we control for socio-
demographic characteristics (SDC1-8), time and country-group fixed effects (t, cd, 
respectively). Hence, our first model is: 
 
ExpCSagreei = α0 + α1CBAc + α2Gtrusti + α3CBAc*Gtrusti + α4ExpESi + α5CBAc*ExpESi + 
α6ExpECSagreei + α7SDCi1-8 + t + cd + εi.                                                                                                              (1)                                                
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The correlation matrix does not suggest that any pair of variables are highly correlated. Since 
the preferred specification includes interaction terms, in order to get the appropriate estimate 
of the variable of interest (CBA), which is also part of all interaction terms, the marginal 
effects are estimated after probit estimation and presented in Table 1
10
.  
 
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
 
The effect of CBA is highly significant and positive. Only marginal effects are reported, since 
the sign, magnitude and significance of coefficients reported in the probit results may be 
misleading when interaction terms are included (Ai and Norton, 2003; Williams, 2012). The 
marginal effects take into account that the CBA is part of the interaction terms (since these are 
included in the regression prior to the calculation of the marginal effects), even though the 
marginal effect of the interaction term cannot be observed separately from the “margins” 
results
11
. Regarding the effect of the trust in government variable on its own, the results imply 
that, as expected, the lower is trust the larger the negative effect it has on the expectations 
about the local currency’s stability. The effect of expectations about the economic situation is 
that the worse the expectations about the economic situation in a country then the larger the 
negative effect on the expectations about the local currency’s stability. Only the effect of the 
“somewhat trust” and “neither trust not distrust” categories compared to “trust completely” 
for the question about trust in government are statistically insignificant, across the estimates.  
 
In order to investigate conditionality between CBA and trust in government, and CBA and the 
economic situation/improvement, the marginal effects of CBA conditional on respectively the 
level of trust and economic state are estimated. These are estimated by calculating the average 
marginal effect of CBA on the probability of expecting the local currency to be stable and 
trustworthy at different levels of trust in government and economic situation expectations 
(calculated after probit estimation of the preferred model). According to the results, the lower 
the trust in government and the worse the expectations about the future economic situation in 
a country, the larger is the positive effect of CBA on expectations about the local currency’s 
future stability (Figures 5 and 6 respectively).  
 
 
Insert Figure 5 around here 
 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 6 around here 
                                                          
10
  The full regression outputs are available from the authors upon request.  
11
 The command "margins“ (introduced in STATA11) does not report the marginal effects of the interaction 
terms, since, as stated in Williams (2012, p.329): 'The value of the interaction term cannot change independently 
of the values of the component terms, so you cannot estimate a separate effect for the interaction.'   
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The test for the significance of the differences in the size of effect of CBA between different 
levels of trust in government and different expectations about the economic situation indicate 
that differences between different groups and the base category are significant.  
Expectations about the stability of the euro also significantly affect the expectations of the 
stability of the local currency: people who expect the euro to be stable are more likely to 
expect their local currency to be stable as well. This is expected, since all countries from the 
sample are current or likely future EU members and their currencies are directly or indirectly 
connected to the euro. The results on country-group dummies indicate that people in countries 
from Ex-Yugoslavia and those with a higher level of development are more likely to expect 
their currencies to be stable than are people from countries that were not members of Ex-
Yugoslavia and which are at a lower level of development. The results further indicate that 
most of the socio-demographic variables are insignificant; the only significant variable is 
“retired” (when unweighted results are observed) indicating that those retired are more likely 
to agree with the statement that the local currency will be stable in future than those 
employed. All time dummy variables (except the one for fall 2009) are significant and 
indicate that the expectations about the local currency became more stable after spring 2009.  
 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted by estimating equation 1 using the logit instead of probit 
estimator and including “do not know” answers for the independent variables. The results of 
these analyses are consistent with those of the preferred model specification/estimator (see 
Table 2). The results of specification in which “do not know” answers for the independent 
variable are included suggest that the effect of the CBA for those who answered “do not 
know” to the question about trust in government is the same as for those who distrust it 
completely, while for those that provided this answer to the question about the economic 
situation it is similar to those that somewhat disagree. Next, the model without interaction 
terms is estimated and again the results do not suggest any major differences. Moreover, 
multinomial probit (where all categories of answers for the dependent variable are included) is 
conducted. The results of this robustness check imply that the preferred results are unlikely to 
be biased since the effect of the variable of interest in the “do not know” category is 
insignificant, while it is still significant and positive when the “agree” (trust in the local 
currency) category is compared to the “disagree” (distrust) category. However, these results 
are only indicative since marginal effects in these cases are difficult to compute and we had to 
exclude interaction terms in order to interpret the effect. Next, the model without the trust in 
government variable, which enabled use of all available data, is estimated. Results of this 
specification again suggest that the CBA has highly significant and positive effect on 
expectations about the future stability of the local currency. The results are similar to those of 
the preferred model specification, in all other respects as well. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
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Although it would be informative to compare survey responses before and after the 
introduction of CBA in order to observe its stabilisation effect this could not be undertaken 
since there is no data available before the introduction of CBA:  the surveys used in this paper 
were not conducted before 2007. Additionally, we cannot investigate whether beliefs about 
CBA stability become stronger the longer it exists. A CBA was introduced in the same year in 
BH and Bulgaria and therefore we cannot include a tenure variable to test for the difference in 
the effect of CBA conditional on the length of its operation. Moreover, the period for which 
the survey data is available is too short to capture the effect of CBA through time by 
introducing an interaction between CBA and time dummy variables.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Enhanced credibility is usually emphasised as a main feature of a CBA’s sustainability, in this 
paper this is empirically investigated for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Since 
credibility can be defined as the public’s beliefs in the announced policy, and under a CBA 
the announced policy is maintenance of a stable local currency (against the anchor currency), 
expectations about the local currency’s stability and trustworthiness have been used as the 
indicator of a CBA’s credibility. Using survey data from ten European transition countries, 
two of which have CBA, the effect of CBA on expectations about the local currency stability 
and trustworthiness was investigated. To our knowledge, expectations about the local 
currency’s stability have not previously been used as an indicator of credibility under a CBA.  
 
A further novelty of this paper is that the credibility of the CBA has been analysed in 
comparison with the credibility of other monetary/exchange rate regimes. Since the dependent 
variable is based on respondents’ expectations we control for the economic situation and 
political/institutional circumstances in the sample countries also using respondents’ 
expectations. Previous studies that investigated the credibility of a central bank utilised actual 
(official) macroeconomic data, but we prefer controls based on respondents’ subjective 
attitudes, since orthodox economic theory is based on the proposition that economic agents 
respond to reality as they perceive and experience it. A particular contribution is that we have 
investigated not only the monetary authority’s credibility under a CBA but also the 
circumstances under which the CBA is most important for the credibility of monetary policy. 
Namely, the model is specified to control for the effect of CBA conditional on the economic 
situation and trust in government. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the effect of CBA on expectations about the 
local currency stability and trustworthiness is positive and significant. Moreover, we find that 
the positive effect of CBA is greater the worse the expectations about economic prospects and 
the lower the trust in government. The survey evidence reported earlier suggests that 
respondents from countries with currency boards are systematically less optimistic/more 
pessimistic about their country’s medium term economic prospects (Figure 3, above) and 
about as trusting/distrusting in government (Figure 4, above) as are respondents from 
transition economies with other monetary regimes. This suggests that the maintenance of 
CBAs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria has been advantageous, a conclusion given 
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increased importance by the severity and persistence of the current global financial crisis. 
Other estimations were conducted and the findings were very similar, suggesting that our 
findings are robust to different model specifications and estimation strategies. Hence, our 
conclusion is that CBAs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria have contributed to the 
credibility of the monetary authorities and consequently assisted overall macroeconomic 
stability. 
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Table 1. Marginal effects from probit estimation of Model 1 
 
Question used for the dependent variable: Over the next five 
years, the [LOCAL CURRENCY] will be very stable and 
trustworthy,  ExpCSagree is dependent variable (1="Strongly 
agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree", 0="Strongly disagree", 
"Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree")  
Unweighted Weighted  
CBA 0.0986*** 0.101*** 
1=CBA is implemented -0.0367 -0.0363 
Base category: CBA not implemented     
Trust in Government     
Gtrust2 0.00938 0.0181 
"I somewhat trust" -0.0175 -0.0179 
Gtrust3 -0.0375* -0.0316 
"I neither trust nor distrust" -0.0201 -0.0197 
Gtrust4 -0.0778*** -0.0715*** 
"I somewhat distrust" -0.0206 -0.0207 
Gtrust5 -0.0911*** -0.0869*** 
 "I do not trust at all" -0.0175 -0.0177 
Base category: Trust in Government: "I trust completely"     
Future economic situation in a country is very good:      
ExpES2 -0.0566*** -0.0489** 
"Agree" -0.0216 -0.0225 
ExpES3 -0.183*** -0.178*** 
"Somewhat agree" -0.0211 -0.0232 
ExpES4 -0.414*** -0.417*** 
"Somewhat disagree" -0.0179 -0.0194 
ExpES5 -0.537*** -0.535*** 
"Disagree" -0.0188 -0.0201 
ExpES6 -0.580*** -0.580*** 
"Strongly disagree" -0.0198 -0.0212 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"     
ExpECSagree 0.136*** 0.134*** 
Future euro stability; 1="Strongly agree", "Agree"    
and "Somewhat agree" 
-0.0121 -0.0123 
Base category: "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and  
"Somewhat disagree" 
    
EU 0.0191 0.0234 
1 if country is a member of EU in the observed period -0.0325 -0.0348 
ExYu 0.121*** 0.122*** 
1 if country was a member of Ex Yugoslavia -0.0419 -0.0439 
high_lev_dev 0.0704** 0.0684** 
1 if country has GDPpc higher than 10,000$ -0.0296 -0.0299 
Socio-demographic (SDC) variables included Yes Yes 
Wave dummies included Yes Yes 
Observations 37,526 37,526 
Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered on region) reported below the marginal effects  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The full sets of results (with socio-demographic variables and wave dummies) are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Table 2. Marginal effects from sensitivity analyses  
 
Question used for the dependent 
variable: Over the next five years, the 
[LOCAL CURRENCY] will be very 
stable and trustworthy, ExpCSagree 
is dependent variable (1="Strongly 
agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree", 
0="Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and 
"Somewhat disagree")  
Logit 
Do not know 
answers for 
independent 
variables 
included 
Interaction 
terms 
excluded 
Large dataset 
(trust in 
government 
variable 
excluded) 
CBA 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.112*** 0.0757** 
1=CBA is implemented -0.0369 -0.0366 -0.0366 -0.0312 
Base category: CBA not implemented         
Trust in Government         
Gtrust2 0.0172 0.0169 0.0224   
"I somewhat trust" -0.0182 -0.0176 -0.0183   
Gtrust3 -0.0316 -0.0326* -0.0276   
"I neither trust nor distrust" -0.02 -0.0196 -0.0204   
Gtrust4 -0.0704*** -0.0732*** -0.0682***   
"I somewhat distrust" -0.0208 -0.0205 -0.0217   
Gtrust5 -0.0871*** -0.0888*** -0.0821***   
 "I do not trust at all" -0.0178 -0.0174 -0.0194   
Gtrustdnk   -0.106***     
"Do not know"   -0.0319     
Base category: Trust in Government: "I trust 
completely"   
  
 
Future economic situation in a 
country is very good:  
        
ExpES2 -0.0497** -0.0496** -0.0404* -0.0392*** 
"Agree" -0.023 -0.0219 -0.0224 -0.013 
ExpES3 -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.169*** -0.172*** 
"Somewhat agree" -0.0234 -0.0227 -0.0248 -0.015 
ExpES4 -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.414*** -0.427*** 
"Somewhat disagree" -0.0196 -0.019 -0.0206 -0.0156 
ExpES5 -0.536*** -0.536*** -0.530*** -0.563*** 
"Disagree" -0.0203 -0.0196 -0.0213 -0.0157 
ExpES6 -0.582*** -0.582*** -0.566*** -0.621*** 
"Strongly disagree" -0.0217 -0.0208 -0.0246 -0.0167 
ExpEsdnk   -0.372***     
"Do not know"   -0.0311     
Base category: "Strongly Agree"         
ExpECSagree 0.137*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.137*** 
Future euro stability; 1="Strongly 
agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree" 
-0.0123 -0.0126 -0.013 -0.0126 
Base category: "Strongly disagree", 
"Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree" 
        
EU 0.0266 0.02 0.0129 -0.012 
1 if country is a member of EU  -0.036 -0.0338 -0.036 -0.0277 
ExYu 0.126*** 0.118*** 0.112** 0.102*** 
1 if country was a member of Ex-
Yugoslavia 
-0.0446 -0.0433 -0.045 -0.0348 
high_lev_dev 0.0695** 0.0716** 0.0722** 0.0722*** 
1 if country has GDPpc higher than 
10,000$ 
-0.0304 -0.03 -0.0305 -0.0274 
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Socio-demographic variables (SDC) 
included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wave dummies included  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 37,526 38,914 37,526 59,292 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects reported with cluster-robust standard errors (clustered on region) and weighted 
The full sets of results (with socio-demographic variables and wave dummies) are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Figure 1. Determinants of the credibility of a monetary authority 
 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration 
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Figure 2. Expectations about the local currency’s stability in CBA and non-CBA countries 
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Figure 3. Expectations about the economic situation in CBA and non-CBA countries 
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Figure 4. Trust in government in CBA and non-CBA countries 
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Figure 5. Average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of expecting the local currency 
to be stable and trustworthy at different levels of trust in government  
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Figure 6. Average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of expecting the local currency 
to be stable and trustworthy at different expectations about the economic situation 
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